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Pornography and Speech Act Theory – An In-Depth Survey1
Considering the short history of the feminist philosophy of language, Rae Langton’s 
article2 “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts” was highly influential as one of the first 
positive research programs within the movement.3 In that paper, Langton – using John 
L. Austin’s speech act theory – tries to interpret Catharine MacKinnon’s thesis: pornog-
raphy is a speech that subordinates and silences women.4 Despite the importance of the 
subject, those unfamiliar with certain historical and contextual features of the topic 
would hardly understand it.
My paper aims to introduce some of the major accounts in this special area at the 
intersection of speech act theory and feminist philosophy. Rather than just reconstruct-
ing Langton’s arguments and the most common objections against it, I will take a more 
holistic approach, examining its surrounding literature as well.
My article has six sections. In Section 1, I contrast the conservative and liberal ar-
guments against pornography and sketch MacKinnon’s liberal critique. In Section 2, I 
give alternative interpretations of MacKinnon’s thesis, “pornography is harm”. In 
Section 3, I try to make sense of the prima facie implausible assumption that pornogra-
phy is speech. In Section 4 and 5, I will analyze the Langtonian theories about subor-
dination and silencing. Finally, in Section 6, I will mention the most challenging 
problems for Langton’s approach, considering the verbal nature of pornography, the 
limits of the protection of free speech, and the different positions on sexual consent.
1. Debate in Context: liberal anti-pornography feminism
The idea that pornography is harmful has a long history, and it appeared in various 
theories over time. Also, questions about the topic are diverse. What is the exact prob-
lem with pornography, and what is the nature of the harm it causes? Is it necessary to 
fight against porn with legal measures, including censorship or bans? If yes, what are 
 1  This research was supported by the ÚNKP-20-3 New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for 
Innovation and Technology from the source of the National Research, Development and Innovation 
Fund.
 2  Langton 1993.
 3  Saul – Diaz 2017.
 4  MacKinnon 1987.
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the legal and political arguments to support such a rule? In this section, I introduce 
different answers to these problems in order to prepare for the later discussion.
Usually, those who think that there is a connection between pornography and the 
silencing of women accept two further consequences of this thesis: pornography causes 
harm and it requires some kind of legal restriction. There are, however, significant dif-
ferences between the supporting arguments for these presumptions, mostly originated 
in one’s ideological background. Therefore, it is useful to sketch these competing theo-
ries, which helps us to locate MacKinnon in the context of the debate.
It is quite common that conservatism lies behind anti-pornography considerations. 
Conservatism is not a coherent and unified theoretical framework, but there is an im-
portant feature which is more or less core of any conservative approach: the state should 
protect traditional religious and moral values. Since pornography erodes these values by 
its inherent obscenity and amorality, regulation by legal measures is required. 
Nevertheless, this line of argumentation feels somehow outdated and relies on broad 
assumptions that have weak support. Indeed, there are more modern conservative ob-
jections to it. The main focus of these is the individual exposed to the content. One 
typical objection is that pornography causes sex addiction. If this is true, which is an 
empirical question, then it can lead to other issues. It may increase sexual harassment 
and rape because of the large number of sex addicted individuals. Sex addiction can 
easily lead to divorce, too. These compounding issues altogether threaten the stability 
of civil society.5
Just as we could not define conservatism as a set of theses, liberal standpoints against 
pornography are diverse. By the term “liberal”, I mean a very general notion. An essen-
tial presumption is that the state’s primary function is to protect its citizens’ freedom 
and equality. However, it seems that from a conservative point of view, it is natural to 
oppose pornography; this is not the case with liberalism. It is worth mentioning that 
liberalism is inherently agnostic about the questions of pornography. There are liberal 
pro-pornography feminists, mostly in the postmodern tradition, who argue that it is an 
individual’s right to make money in this way, and regulating pornography would vio-
late this right.6 So, from a liberal point of view, how can one argue against 
pornography?
Liberal feminists’ arguments mainly focus on women’s rights; in contrast to con-
servatism, they reject any argument based on obscenity or religious considerations. This 
means that creating or distributing sexually explicit content in itself poses no problem 
at all. Instead, their focus is on the violation of equality and free speech caused by 
women’s subordination in a pornographic content. Motivated by these insights, 
 5  Wyatt 2009, 538.
 6  Watson 2010, 541.
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MacKinnon argued for two theses: (i) women are currently not equal members of soci-
ety; (ii) pornography contributes to this inequality.7
Understanding the first thesis, we should consider two things. The first one is the 
unequal distribution of material goods, salaries, and other socioeconomic factors. These 
observations are supported by empirical research. The second is the higher probability 
that in a sexual crime – harassment or rape – the victim will be a woman instead of a 
man. MacKinnon needed to explain this statistical difference; this is why she came up 
with the second thesis: pornography is why women are more often victims of sexual 
crime than men. This assumption may seem exaggerated at first, but it is important to 
note that MacKinnon uses the term “pornography” in a special sense, distinguishing it 
from erotica, which is any other sexually explicit content:
We define pornography as the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through 
pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or 
commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated, 
bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexual submission or servility or display; re-
duced to body parts, penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of deg-
radation, injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised or hurt in context 
which makes these conditions sexual.8
According to MacKinnon, pornography can influence its viewers, so that they tend 
to exhibit aggressive sexual behavior and are willing to accept sexual myths – e.g., 
women secretly fantasise about rape – than those who avoid pornographic content. 
These thoughts were influential and led to the Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance, 
written by Andrea Dworkin and MacKinnon in 1984, Indianapolis.9
In the ordinance, pornography was defined as content that bribes civil rights. 
Nevertheless, this law was challenged in court and overturned as unconstitutional not 
long after its acceptance. The decision was based on the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech. Using the First Amendment to 
protect the manufacturing and sale of pornographic content led to unfortunate conse-
quences, not just legally but also philosophically speaking. Because pornography de jure 
is defined as some kind of speech act, anyone who would like to contribute practically 
to the debate should regard it as speech too.
 7  MacKinnon 1987, 163–197; Langton 1990, 331–336.
 8  MacKinnon 1987, 176. Note that this definition begs the question: is pornography harmful? We only 
need to add the highly intuitive premises that dehumanization and objectification are harmful to arrive 
at the conclusion. This can be a drawback of MacKinnon’s definition, since the moral status of pornog-
raphy is a complex issue, which is still highly debated.
 9  Langton 1990, 336.
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Therefore, MacKinnon argued that pornography is a harmful speech which subor-
dinates and silences women. If she can prove this thesis, she gets closer to her aim to 
regulate pornography legally. MacKinnon is seemingly in a challenging position: for 
liberal feminists, free speech is one of the most important civil rights, so why would she 
limit it by regulating pornography? According to MacKinnon, pornography on its own 
violates freedom of speech by silencing, which can even lead to rape, so the losses of 
banning pornography would be negligible compared to the harm that it does now.
To sum up, MacKinnon’s argument is based on the idea that pornography in itself 
violates freedom of speech. Call this thesis “the silencing argument”. Since the original 
silencing argument, taken literally, is trivially false – pornography is not harm, as it is 
not speech, and certainly does not interfere with anyone’s ability to speak –, it drew 
many objections. In her 1993 article, Rae Langton tried to give a coherent philosophi-
cal interpretation of MacKinnon’s insights using the speech act theory, and a still ongo-
ing debate was started just after she published her arguments.
In the next section, I continue with the illocutionary approach to pornography, 
after I differentiated between various interpretations of the thesis of inherent harm 
caused by pornography. Note that Langton admits that it does not follow from her 
thesis that pornography should be banned or censored. As Alex Davies showed – and it 
was also MacKinnon’s original aim – providing the legal support for victims to sue the 
creators of pornographic content would be a desirable goal. Another approach – incon-
sistent with MacKinnon’s views – is to produce more ethical pornographic movies – or 
“erotic films” –, to crowd out harmful content. However, it is essential to distinguish 
between pornography’s role in silencing and specific strategies to solve this issue: these 
should be considered separate subjects and I will consider only the first problem here.
2. Understanding MacKinnon
So, according to MacKinnon, “pornography is harm” – but what does this mean exact-
ly? We already have answers like watching pornography leads to porn addiction, or that 
it is morally wrong, but the main question is whether those who are not consumers of 
pornography – especially women – are really in danger because of its existence.10 If the 
answer is yes, then what causes this harm?
Lori Watson, who analyzed MacKinnon’s account, distinguished at least two differ-
ent interpretations of her thesis. According to the so-called causal model, pornography 
causes its harm through an intermediary agent. “On this view pornography in itself is 
 10  Watson 2010, 542, n43.
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not subordinating, rather it causes the subordination of women by altering the beliefs/
desires/motivations for action of men who consume in such a way that women, either 
as individuals or as a group, are harmed.”11
The other interpretation relies on a conceptual model, followed by MacKinnon and 
her proponents. Those who accept the conceptual model probably endorse the weaker 
causal model too. Taking a look at the Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance, we 
may get an intuitive picture of what this model is about: men subordinate women who 
act in porn films. It is just the surface of the issue that the actors are actually depicted 
in subordinated positions in such films or pictures. The real harm appears when we 
consider the social network and resources necessary to create content, and we take a 
look at pornography as a social practice. From this perspective, we can see that everyone 
suffers the consequences of pornography. Actresses are usually in a vulnerable position, 
sometimes are victims of human trafficking, slavery, child abuse, or battery. MacKinnon 
spoke about all of these phenomena when she said that pornography is harm.
Before we start to examine the silencing argument by Langton 1993, we have to 
take another detour to understand the relevant terms in John L. Austin’s How to Do 
Things With Words.12 Austin’s aim was to draw attention to an often overlooked fact: 
speaking is just another form of doing things; hence he coined the term speech act. 
According to Austin, by saying something, we usually do at least three things. If some-
one says “Close the window”, then at first, the speaker utter an English sentence with a 
specific meaning and denotation, which Austin calls the locutionary act. Besides the 
locutionary act, one uttered this sentence with a certain force: it was a demand, or a 
request, or an order, or whatever was her intention. The complete locutionary act ut-
tered with a certain force is called the illocutionary act. A sentence usually can have 
different locutionary forces. Furthermore, if the speaker’s speech act was successful, it 
had some effect on the hearer; for example, he closes the window – Austin calls this a 
perlocutionary effect.
There are two more elements of speech act theory which Langton relies on; howev-
er, it is debated whether Austin accepted these. First, when it comes to the speakers’ 
intention, she can carry out an illocutionary act without even intending to do so. For 
example, as someone’s chief, one may intend to advise unintentionally, and her speech 
act turns out as an order. Second, for a speech act to succeed, uptake – i.e. recognizing 
the speaker’s intention – is a necessary requirement.13
In the first sentence of her article, Langton – following MacKinnon – makes it clear 
that “pornography is speech”,14 connecting the subject matter with the scholarly on 
 11  Watson 2010, 542.
 12  Austin 1955.
 13  Langton 1993, 301.
 14  Langton 1993, 293.
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communication and philosophy of language. It is not a usual move, but from this point 
of view, it is possible to apply Austin’s distinctions to understand MacKinnon’s thesis 
better: pornography has the illocutionary force of subordination. However, is this a 
successful strategy? There are further problems which we should investigate in order to 
answer this question. Can we seriously say that “pornography is speech” and use Austin’s 
theoretical framework to investigate the phenomena? (Section 3.) If the answer is yes, 
can we say that subordination is a unique illocutionary force of a speech act? (Section 
4.) What is the exact connection between subordination and silencing? (Section 5.) 
How can pornography silence its victims? (Section 6.) I will consider these issues in the 
subsequent sections.
3. Pornography as Speech
It is one thing to consider pornography as speech for legal reasons, but it is an entirely 
different matter to examine it as verbal content with philosophical aims in mind. There 
is an extensive debate on the possibility of this, which we will introduce here, mainly 
relying on Louise Anthony’s article. One trivial approach to the discourse is to take 
pornography as a kind of speech literally. However, it is hard to see how this can work: 
there are erotic novels which we can call “pornography”, but the term denotes pictures, 
videos, movies, typically using pictorial representation, which is essentially different 
from linguistic representation.15 Linguistic representation is intensional, so they are 
considered meaningful, which would be hard to say about pictures.16 Even if we ascribe 
some kind of meaning to pictures, this meaning will be polysemic, so the illocutionary 
force would also be indeterminate.17 This observation contradicts Langton’s thesis 
which states that pornography has the illocutionary force of subordination.
Besides, actors utter sentences in porn movies, which also can be the subject of 
Langton’s thesis: “pornography is speech”. There are two problems with this approach. 
First, these sentences are uttered in a fictional context. Like those uttered by a character 
in a movie or a play, these speech acts do not have illocutionary force; they are merely 
parasitic speech acts.18 Secondly, the characters in porn movies usually do not use the 
kinds of speech acts required by the Langtonian theory. According to Anthony, a gen-
uine subordinating speech act in the movie should be uttered by the director – or any-
 15  Anthony 2011.
 16  Fodor 2007.
 17  Searle 1968.
 18  Searle 1975. Alternatively, one can think that a special kind of fictive illocutionary force comes into play 
in these cases, see Currie 1985.
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one else who is not represented as a character – and should say something like the fol-
lowing: “I hereby subordinate women!”, a sentence which is not very frequently said in 
porn films. The conclusion is that even if pornography has some kind of a “message”, 
that must be implicit content, which is better analyzed with the Gricean theory of im-
plicatures than the Austinian theory of speech acts.19
Jennifer Hornsby is another scholar who tried to solve this issue, emphasizing three 
features of porn that make it hard to count these films as communicative speech acts. 
(i) Viewers are rarely able to differentiate an exact message which is communicated. (ii) 
Even if one can distinguish an actual message conveyed through the medium, this 
message certainly has not been intended by the creators. (iii) This content can not be 
recognized as an intentionally conveyed message.20
Hornsby proposes a unique solution to this problem. Even if Austin’s theory does 
not contain the analysis of non-communicative acts, it is possible to extend it with the 
notion of forceful acts, which can cover the phenomena in question. According to 
Hornsby, expressing propositional content is not a necessary requirement – hence these 
are non-communicative – for an act to have an illocutionary force: in particular, por-
nography has the illocutionary force of subordination. This illocutionary force does not 
come from authorial intentions, nor from the dialogues in the films, but rather “it is 
something achieved in its consumption”.21 This approach is not unorthodox; even John 
Searle provides examples of certain acts22 expressing illocutionary force without propo-
sitional content.
It is probably true that not everyone is pleased with Hornsby’s solution. Nevertheless, 
it is crucial to distinguish between two different problems in this area. First, if one has 
practical aims in mind, accepting the court’s premise that pornography is de jure speech 
is a necessary step. The usual way is that lawyers try to show that pornography should 
not be protected by the law of free speech, which was MacKinnon’s original motivation 
to develop her harmful speech account – and making some trouble for philosophers of 
language. It would be interesting to see that someone argues against pornography being 
a speech to conclude that free speech laws should not protect it.
I think that the de facto communicative content status of pornography is still an 
open question. Even though many promising approaches have been developed during 
the years, the thesis still needs more justification due to its revolutionary nature. 
However, most philosophers keep an eye on the practical issues, so they presume that it 
is possible to discuss topics on pornography as it were a kind of speech. For this reason, 
 19  Grice 1975.
 20  Hornsby 2011, 382.
 21  Hornsby 2011, 383 (emphasis in the original). See also Langton 2011.
 22  E.g., “Hooray!” or “Ouch!” See Searle 1969.
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I will accept this assumption from now on, and in the next section, I continue with 
Langton’s theory of subordinating illocutionary acts.
4. The Illocutionary Act of Subordination
Langton’s first problem is this: can we even consider subordination an illocutionary act? 
Her answer is positive: for example, it is plausible to think that a sign on a coffee shop 
door that says “whites only” has the illocutionary force of subordination.23 Its intended 
perlocutionary effect is the separation of whites and other people of color and keeping 
racist attitudes alive.
If we can accept that the sign mentioned above can have the illocutionary force of 
subordination, then the next question is: what are the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for a speech act to have this illocutionary force? Langton specifies three attributes 
of the illocutionary force of subordination. (i) It ranks between different social groups. 
(ii) It legitimates discriminatory behavior by depriving the power of underprivileged 
groups. (iii) Only members of privileged groups can subordinate members of under-
privileged groups. An essential addition to these conditions is that (i)–(iii) happen 
unjustly.
According to Langton, pornography as a speech act fulfills at least two of the three 
conditions: “Pornography is said to rank women as sex objects ‘defined on the basis of 
[their] looks [...] their availability for sexual pleasure. [...] Pornography sexualizes rape, 
battery, sexual harassment, [...] and child sexual abuse [...] it celebrates, promotes, au-
thorizes and legitimates them’ These descriptions bear on the claim that pornography 
subordinates.”24 She thinks that it is plausible to think that pornography has the illocu-
tionary force of subordination due to these features. It has the probable perlocutionary 
effects of disposing viewers to believe rape myths and victim-blaming. It would be hard 
to deny that all of this is unjust, so it also fulfills the additional requirement.
Since proper authority is required as well, Langton argues that in the discourse 
about sex, unfortunately, pornography has authority.25 Besides this, she also considers 
the connection between authors’ intentions and the illocutionary force of a speech act. 
Those who create these films probably do not want to subordinate or silence women – 
 23  Prima facie it seems that primarily, the sign has some kind of directive illocutionary force, and subordi-
nation is rather a secondary illocutionary force. However, Langton does not consider the theory of se-
condary illocutionary forces, which would be an interesting addition to her view.
 24  MacKinnon 1987, 163–197, cited by Langton 1993, 307 (italics in the original denoting illocutionary 
verbs).
 25  Langton 1993, 312.
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they aim to make a profit. Langton argues that our speech acts may have a different il-
locutionary force than intended, as I mentioned in Section 2: e.g. a commander may 
try to advise his inferior, but due to the hierarchical nature of the military, his speech 
act will count as an order.26
5. Silencing Argument and Speech Act Theory
The most crucial part of Langton’s article is perhaps the part where she presents her si-
lencing argument. Even though the principle has many interpretations, prima facie it 
seems implausible to think that pornography silences women: despite the movies being 
still out there, women can speak. It is a more promising approach to connect the silenc-
ing argument with the subordination thesis: pornography, due to its illocutionary 
force, subordinates women and contributes to the spread of rape myths, creating an 
unsupportive or even offensive communicative environment. This environment can 
contribute to women’s silencing by blocking certain speech acts, for example, the re-
fusal of sex.
In what ways can a woman be silenced? Langton has six examples of situations 
where someone makes an utterance but it fails. The first four examples are general cases 
in casual situations; the last two are from sexual discourses. Let us see the first group of 
examples.27 The first thought experiment was originally presented by Donald Davidson, 
and it is about the illocutionary act of warning. Suppose that we are in the theatre 
watching a play. The play is currently at a stage where, according to the story, there is 
supposed to be a fire on stage. However, the building catches on fire simultaneously, 
and the actors cannot warn the audience by shouting “Fire!” because everyone thinks 
that this is all part of the play. The second example is marriage: two gay men say in the 
right context “Yes”, but their speech act does not have the intended perlocutionary ef-
fect because same-sex marriage is not legal there. The third example is voting in apart-
heid countries: in South Africa, if a white person draws a circle in the box and puts the 
paper in the ballot box, it counts as a vote. If black people do the same, their acts will 
not qualify as an act of voting; it is an unspeakable act for them. The fourth example is 
divorce: according to Islamic law, if a man utters three times the expression “mutal-
laqua”, he successfully divorced his wife. As opposed to this, if a woman utters the ex-
pression three times, it does not have any effect.
 26  Langton 1993, 309. Note that this is a debated question, and Langton does not provide strong argu-
ments to defend her position. One can think that the commander just gave the advice as he intended, 
despite the military hierarchy.
 27  Langton 1993, 316–317.
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Langton considers these cases as casual forms of silencing. However, Nicole Wyatt 
draws attention to a relevant difference between the Davidsonian case and the other 
three cases. Marriage, voting, and divorce are highly regulated acts; most requirements 
are described legally. In these cases, the problem which causes the “silencing” clearly is 
that the speakers do not fit the requirements for a successful act.28 It would be strange 
to consider these as examples of silencing.
According to Wyatt, the example of the theatre fire differs in at least two ways. First, 
the illocutionary act of warning has no conventions: one can cry loud “Fire!” or one can 
put a sign on the fence indicating that the dog bites, or one can use hand signals if one 
thinks that the other people could not hear my voice – these are all appropriate ways to 
warn someone about something, none of them are part of any convention or legal code. 
Secondly, it seems that the nature of failure is different: in the cases of marriage, di-
vorce, or voting, the speaker’s stance is impossible. The only way to convey these speech 
acts is to change conventions, which is a slow process with a high possibility of social 
resistance – in contrast to these, a highly motivated actor can somehow warn his audi-
ence. Even though Davidson proves that in theory every speech act of the actor can be 
interpreted as it is just a part of the play, taking into consideration a real scenario, it is 
implausible to suppose that the context of the play overwrites everything, and when the 
actor jumps off the stage and runs away, the viewers indeed start to suspect that some-
thing is not right. This difference will be important later.
Let us examine the example of silencing in the context of sexual discourses.29 The 
first example is refusal. It happens that women try to refuse men, but their speech act 
fails, which leads to rape. There are two ways in which refusal can fail. In the first case, 
the hearer recognizes the speaker’s intention but he does not care – this is a typical ex-
ample of sexual assault. From a philosophical standpoint, the other case is more relevant 
to Langton: the speaker tries to refuse sex but the hearer is not able to recognize her 
intention – perhaps due to the rape myths encoded in pornography, he believes that a 
woman never says no to sex, or “no” means “yes” – so her speech act fails. The second 
example is protest. This example comes from the context of porn actress Linda Lovelace’s 
book Ordeal. In the book, she tells her story about the filming of Deep Throat, where 
she was mistreated and abused in order to play the part perfectly. The author’s intention 
was to protest against women’s subordination in the porn industry, but her book was 
sold later as an erotic novel for adults. This means that Linda Lovelace’s protest was not 
successful; the audience interpreted her story as fiction. These two examples are similar 
to the Davidsonian cases in the sense that the illocutionary uptake was missing because 
of contextual elements, not because it violated a particular rule.
 28  Wyatt 2009, 137. See also Austin 1955 for a collection of different kinds of failures.
 29  Langton 1993, 320–322.
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How can we analyze these two examples?30 As Austin distinguished between locu-
tionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, different levels of silencing can be dis-
tinguished too. On a locutionary level, it is possible to silence someone by stuffing 
something into her mouth, by playing loud music, or by interfering with the commu-
nication lines. In these cases, even hearing the speaker is impossible. Another case is 
when the hearer ignores the speaker, e.g. someone asks me to close the window, but I 
do not do anything. Langton calls this perlocutionary frustration. Finally, it is possible 
to create communicative contexts where the speakers’ illocutionary intentions are hard 
or even impossible to recognize. This is called illocutionary disablement, which leads to 
the incapability of the hearer’s uptake.
Using these tools, we can reconstruct Langton’s silencing argument in the following 
way. Pornography, with its subordinating illocutionary force, creates a hostile environ-
ment of communication for women about sex by promoting rape myths that they enjoy 
rough or violent treatment and never refuse sexual advances. Those affected by these 
myths will not understand women’s refusal of sex, because they will think that all of this 
is just “part of the game”. In the worst case scenario, they will interpret it as consent, so 
the victim’s speech acts were silenced by illocutionary disablement, leading to possible 
rape.
Langton’s silencing argument – based on illocutionary disablement – later inspired 
feminist philosophers to propose further developments on the topic. In her 2016 arti-
cle, Laura Caponetto examined these novel silencing arguments using John Searle’s 
speech act theory. The first one is Mary Kate McGowan’s sincerity-silencing. The idea 
relies on the distinction between the sincerity condition, the intention to be sincere, 
and the intended illocutionary force. The speaker is silenced sincerely if the intended 
illocutionary act has a sincerity requirement, the speaker fulfills this requirement but 
the hearer does not recognize it.31 Another suggestion by McGowan is the authority 
silencing, which comes into place when the hearer cannot recognize – or recognized 
somewhat mistakenly – the speaker’s authority on a given discourse. According to 
McGowan – following Searle in this respect – certain speech acts have an authority 
required to be successful, as the order: a lieutenant cannot give commands to a general 
due to the specified hierarchy in the military. McGowan argues that refusal is also an 
authoritative act, not necessarily recognized by everyone, because the speaker has au-
thority over her own body. Caponetto differentiates this account by highlighting a 
distinction between the examples of the theatrical actor and the refusal. In the case of 
the actor, the hearers mistakenly think that the actor’s warning was just a part of the 
 30  Caponetto 2016, 186.
 31  McGowan 2014; Caponetto 2016, 187.
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play – so it was a sincerity silencing due to the lack of illocutionary force –, in the case 
of the refusal, it has an illocutionary force, but it is recognized mistakenly.32
These are all exceptional additions to the scholarly on illocutionary silencing, but in 
the following, I will focus exclusively on Langton’s silencing argument, as it had the 
most significant impact. In the next section, I will examine the most common argu-
ments against Langton’s proposal.
6. Problems with Langton’s silencing-argument
I have already examined the issue of considering pornography as some kind of speech 
in Section 3: from a philosophical point of view, it raises serious problems, but if we 
have practical aims in mind, it is justifiable. However, even if we are committed to the 
view that pornography is speech, what guarantees that Austin’s speech act theory is the 
best tool to analyze the phenomena?
Jennifer Saul raised an issue against Langton’s approach based on a presumption of 
the framework, which says that only communicative acts in certain contexts can be 
speech acts. Pornography as a cinematic genre is not such content, so it is dubious 
whether it can have any illocutionary force.33 If we can not ascribe illocutionary force 
to pornography, then evidently, it can not have the illocutionary force of subordination, 
either. Saul makes modifications to Langton’s original theory to solve this issue: the fact 
that pornography itself can not have any illocutionary force does not mean that it can 
not have illocutionary force in certain contexts where the film is played. So, porn does 
not have illocutionary force, only its views in certain contexts.
If we incorporate this idea into Langton’s theory, we see that views of pornographic 
content have the illocutionary force of subordination. According to Saul, this is an 
implausible account, since there are several different contexts in which one can watch 
pornography: at home, in the cinema, in a laboratory carrying out experiments, or in a 
feminist workshop for demonstrative purposes. Of course, the problem is that these 
contexts are very diverse, and it seems to be a mistake to say that each of these plays 
bears the illocutionary act of subordination. But the weaker yet plausible thesis that in 
some cases pornography has the illocutionary force of subordination seems too weak for 
Langton’s purposes. Saul suggests that if Langton cannot strengthen her account, then 
it would be a good step to leave the illocutionary approach – and Austin’s speech act 
 32  Caponetto 2016, 188.
 33  Saul 2006.
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theory altogether – behind to find a better framework to analyze the subordination of 
women by pornography.
In his critique, Alexander Bird tried to show that Langton made a mistake about the 
requirements of a successful speech act: uptake is not one of them. In Langton’s theory, 
the presumption that the speaker cannot refuse due to the lack of illocutionary uptake 
is a key element – leading to the consequence that no act of refusal has been made. Bird 
relies on Jacobson’s ethical principle to show an unwanted consequence of Langton’s 
proposal: if the victim has not refused the sexual advances of the rapist, he can not be 
blamed or punished for his crime, because he did nothing against her will. Questions 
of consent are a complex topic, and even though the lack of explicit refusal does not 
mean consent, it seems that the rapist’s crime is not as serious on Langton’s account as 
it seems intuitively.34
Bird raises a further issue. At first, he mentions examples of successful speech acts 
where the uptake was not guaranteed. For example, judicial judgments are still success-
ful, even though nobody recognizes this. Alternatively, let us suppose that John writes 
his will, but the paper has gone missing, and the family only finds it after years have 
passed. The act of making John’s will was successful when he wrote it; it does not matter 
that nobody found or read it. Surrendering in a battle is also such an act. It is successful, 
even if the opposing force does not recognize the speaker’s intention.35
Considering Bird’s examples, it is plausible to say that not every speech act requires 
an uptake to succeed. Bird’s task is now to show that refusal is such an act. He does this 
by illustrative examples and analogies. Suppose that Bill got a wedding invitation, but 
he thinks that the wedding is just a joke, as he never heard of his friend to be proposed 
or even that he has a fiancée. In this case, Bill clearly has not recognized the speaker’s 
intention – which was invitation – but it would be a mistake to say that Bill was not 
invited to the wedding.
If invitation is a speech act that does not require uptake, then it is plausible to 
suppose that refusal is such an act too. Bird’s example is the case of Jacques, the arrogant 
chef. Jacques thinks that everyone wants to taste his delicious food, and if someone 
refuses to get another meal, they must be too shy to ask for more. If Langton is right, 
then when someone refuses to take Jacques’s meal and he fails to recognize this and still 
gives them more food, no act of refusal has happened. However, this seems implausible: 
Bird thinks that there was a refusal, only Jacques was unwilling to accept it, as in the 
original case of the refusal of sex.36
 34  Jacobson 1995; Bird 2002, 3.
 35  Bird 2002, 7–10.
 36  Bird 2002, 10–12.
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Alex Davies reacts to Langton’s theory from another point of view: he draws atten-
tion to the fact that she relies on an unpopular approach to freedom of speech, which 
does not make her account incoherent, but makes it disadvantaged in contrast to other 
theories which rely on the mainstream theory.37 Let us see how Davies reconstructs 
Langton’s silencing argument in five points:
(1) Assumption1: Langton claims that certain special illocutionary acts (SIAs) 
are protected speech.
(2) Assumption2: If uptake fails for an illocutionary act, then there was no illo-
cutionary act.
(3) Assumption3: Pornography causes failed uptake for SIAs.
(4) (2) and (3): Pornography silences SIAs.
(5) (1) and (4): Pornography silences protected speech.38
Davies sketches the so-called Millian view of free speech: everyone has the right to 
express their opinion without restrictions, but this right does not grant that everyone 
should be heard or their intention be acknowledged. In terms of speech act theory, the 
speaker’s illocution is not protected, only their locution is. Davies illustrates the prob-
lem with an example:
[I]n a lecture on Frege, a lecturer may express her own view about logicism while the 
students unreasonably confuse this for a presentation of Frege’s view of logicism. Did she 
therefore fail to say what she thinks? Her capacity to give voice to her own voice is not 
that enslaved to the doziness of her audience. But then the way in which speech is sup-
posed to be silenced by pornography, according to Langton’s silencing argument, doesn’t 
apply to protected speech on the Millian conception.39
Nevertheless, Langton made her opposition to the Millian standpoint explicit: the 
protection of free speech should incorporate the protection of certain illocutionary acts, 
too.40 Davies accepts that it is possible to extend the protection of the freedom of 
speech to the illocutionary acts, but he is skeptical about the protection of uptake. 
Davies’ point is that even though this unorthodox theory of free speech is not incon-
sistent, it poses significant disadvantages compared to rival theories. At the end of his 
paper, Davies presents a better version of the silencing argument, which does not face 
this problem.
 37  Davies 2014, 4–5.
 38  Davies 2014, 4.
 39  Davies 2014, 5.
 40  Hornsby – Langton 1998.
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Besides the three objections mentioned above, the notion of “consent” and “refusal” 
– critical elements in Langton’s silencing argument – also generated a considerable de-
bate.41 Two basic models are available in the discussion: the “no means no” approach is 
more permissive: until the woman explicitly says “no”, the sexual act is consensual. If 
we use this model to understand Langton’s silencing argument, Jacobson’s objection 
immediately arises: if the woman is not able to express her refusal, then we have to 
consider the sexual act consensual, which excuses the rapist from his crime.
However, the affirmative model is more common: according to this view, the con-
sensual sexual act requires explicit verbal consent. It seems that Langton’s theory only 
works if we accept the affirmative model, which allows an escape route from Jacobson-
type objections.
Joan McGregor examines the notion of consent from a legal perspective, emphasiz-
ing that the focus should be on protecting women’s autonomy over their bodies. The 
laws in the US require explicit refusal and physical harm of the victim to make it a case 
of rape. According to McGregor, both requirements are too strong. In most cases, there 
is no opportunity for an explicit refusal. Against the traditional rape myths, sexual 
harassment and rape are expected in an everyday environment of colleagues, friends, or 
even in a marriage by manipulating, deceiving, and threatening women. According to 
McGregor, even in situations where there is explicit consent, there is a place for suspi-
cion, e.g. consent between the employer and employee is not always honest. In the case 
of physical harm, McGregor states that “the law should make it clear that sexual activity 
is inconsistent with violence”.42
McGregor’s insights seem intuitively correct, but there are circumstances where the 
matter is not that simple in practice. In the BDSM subculture, participants often rely 
on master-servant roles, making it hard to interpret the notion of consent. In some of 
the roleplays, giving and receiving pain is the primary source of pleasure; in some cases, 
a “conventional” sexual act does not even happen. That it is consensual can be the only 
distinction between a BDSM scenario and rape, especially in games where participants 
imitate sexual assault. Potentially every situation like this can lead to violated consent. 
D.J. Williams – who is also an active member of the subculture – acknowledges that 
most participants have been in situations that were not consensual, and to prevent cases 
like these, he created a special communicative framework for BDSM participation.43
 41  These issues are relevant due to Langton’s assumption that pornography has the effect of creating com-
municative situations which make rape easier to commit through making the rapist more insensitive to 
the victim’s real communicative intentions. Keep in mind that this assumption needs empirical 
support.
 42  McGregor 1996, 208.
 43  Williams 2004.
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It is not necessary to go this far to understand how complex the issue of consent is: 
“while perhaps it might be helpful if people said exactly what they wanted – if they were 
direct, clear and obvious all the time and in every way – this is not the nature of reality. 
While frequent and direct communication is desired, there is always more that is left 
unsaid.”44 However, I think these questions are essential when we try to analyze 
Langton’s silencing argument, since her main point is that there are some cases of rape 
where the rapist cannot recognize the refusal, and he thinks that the sexual act is 
consensual.
As I mentioned earlier, the Jacobsonian objection, which points to the silencing 
argument’s unwanted consequences – i.e. the rapist is not responsible for the crime he 
committed due to his beliefs – can be eliminated by using a different notion of consent. 
It can be a beneficial theoretical decision; however, practically it causes trouble, since we 
turn away from the legal definition of consent. The problem is that Langton’s motiva-
tion comes from the desire to be consistent with legal practices: this is why MacKinnon 
started to speak about pornography as a kind of speech, and Langton tried to make it a 
coherent philosophical view. If we – by this presumption – try to be consistent with the 
law, then we can not solve this issue by relying on another notion of consent. So, the 
Jacobsonian issue is still open.
Wyatt’s insights mentioned above posed another issue: refusal, as in the example of 
the actor, is not entirely impossible; it is just harder because of certain circumstances. 
As the actor can communicate his intentions if he tries hard enough, similarly, Langton’s 
proposal seems unlikely in real life: “The problem with this is that it does indeed seem 
extremely implausible to suggest that a common way in which rapes happen is by the 
rapist simply, sincerely, and consciously believing that the woman (equally simply, 
sincerely, and consciously) means ‘yes’ when she says ‘no’. Rape is not some kind of 
hilarious sitcom-style case of crossed wires.”45 In a real life scenario, it is hard to imagine 
that the victim was unable to express her refusal, and the rapist was unable to interpret 
it as an honest act thereof.
Besides these issues, the communicative model that Langton proposes is too simple: 
consent and refusal is not just a one-word “yes” or “no” discourse, but usually embed-
ded in a more complex discursive situation. It makes it questionable whether Langton’s 
description is adequate for the analysis of the situation at all.
Finally, the definition of pornography has changed over time and lost its original 
meaning. Of course, it should not be a problem, since the term has an intuitive every-
day meaning and use, but MacKinnon altered it, giving it an entirely new definition, 
which is not identical to the word’s intuitive meaning (see Section 1). Those who con-
 44  Williams 2004.
 45  Finlayson 2014, 781. However, Finlayson tried to defend Langton against this objection.
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tribute to this debate should clarify which sense they rely on in order to avoid 
confusion.
Considering some of these issues, Lorna Finlayson chose the motto “MacKinnon, 
not Austin!” in her 2014 meta-article on the debate. Her article’s main point is that 
something has gone wrong in the academic discourse following Langton, focusing 
mainly on meticulous questions, such as the proper distinction between illocution and 
perlocution, the status and definition of pornography, and the like. Meanwhile, the 
practical aims of the whole issue are now blurred by endless verbal debates. Finlayson 
argues that feminist philosophers should return to MacKinnon’s original text, because 
even though analytic feminists “see their project as one in the service of greater clarity 
and rigor, thereby potentially increasing the accessibility and persuasiveness of the si-
lencing argument to an analytic audience”,46 in these debates, the most critical ques-
tions are left unanswered.
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